By Harel Chorev, Asaf Romirowsky, JNS
Even so, terrorists in the Gaza Strip will not simply abandon their jihadist essence; doing so would strip them of their very raison d’être.
The historical events and their magnitude following Israel’s ceasefire with Hamas are not a result of one single factor. Clearly, the courage and sacrifice of the Israel Defense Forces throughout the war these past two years, especially during the operation to conquer Gaza City, created immense pressure within Hamas in Gaza to agree to a halt in fighting.
Izz al-Din al-Haddad, the commander of Hamas’s military wing who previously thwarted the last deal and dictated an uncompromising line to Palestinian politician Khalil al-Hayya in Qatar, was forced to acknowledge the firm grasp around him and the need to show some flexibility. The Israeli attack on Sept. 9 targeting Hamas leaders in Doha failed operationally, though appears to have shaken their confidence not only towards Israel but also toward their hosts.
A clear sign of Hamas’s flexibility is that the deal discussed just three months ago was intrinsically different from the one finalized—namely, how far the Israeli withdrawal would be, the number of hostages to be released and the fear that Hamas would try to keep hostages as long-term insurance policy.
The determination and role of U.S. President Donald Trump in pushing for this deal and ending the war were central and critical. Unlike former President Joe Biden, Trump clearly understood that the war would not end through empty diplomacy and stalling without applying heavy military and political pressure on Hamas. Trump gave Israel strong backing—in words and in ammunition—but also applied measured pressure to bring Israel to the strategic point that would maximize its military gains and end a war that deeply eroded its diplomatic standing.
Trump had a real and sincere commitment to resolving the hostage issue, and he did not hide his view that ending the war would allow for far-reaching changes to promote stability and normalization across the Middle East. At key moments, he and his team were aligned with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu; overall, Trump proved far more consistent in policy than the “unpredictable” an image often attributed to him. In Israel, he will be remembered as a historic figure and a true friend, unlike any other White House.
The third factor that helped achieve the long-awaited deal was the mediators: Qatar and Turkey, both pro-Hamas, alongside Egypt. These actors concluded that without applying heavy pressure on Hamas, the war would not end and might even directly endanger them. This was especially true for Egypt, which paid a heavy economic price due to disruptions in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, and feared a massive influx of Palestinians as part of Trump’s migration plan.
For months, Egypt had faced heavy internal and external Arab public pressure to take aggressive action in support of the Palestinians—a direct threat to Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s regime. Qatar, which believed that it could keep playing games and enjoy neutrality, was shaken by the Israeli strike on its soil. It had good reason to suspect that the attack on Hamas leadership was coordinated with U.S. Department of Defense, which undermined its confidence and pushed it to help end the war. Turkey, beyond its stated interest in ending the war that devastated the Palestinians, also saw diplomatic and military gains (particularly, the F-35 Lightning II deal) in strengthening its alliance with Washington.
For Hamas, the first stage of the deal brings a real prospect of ending the war. But there is also an immediate and critical gain for the organization: the release of senior terrorists from Israeli prisons will allow it to quickly rebuild its shattered leadership and military command, which has been almost entirely wiped out.
To the last men standing in the Strip—al-Haddad and Ra’ad Sa’ad—will now join released prisoners, some of whom are considered high-level terror operators with experience, charisma and the legitimacy of those who have spent many years behind bars.
However, the dilemma of releasing such murderers—not only because of their past but because of their dangerous future—must be resolved through the same offensive approach that Israel failed to use when it still had a chance to eliminate senior Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar and his comrades.
This offensive approach should also guide Israel’s overall policy toward Hamas, regardless of the deal. No agreement can stop a jihadist movement like Hamas from doing what it has always done in times of crisis: absorb the blow and rebuild in preparation for the next round against its enemy, Israel. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad will not abandon their jihadist essence; doing so would strip them of their very raison d’être. In their view, which also drove the Oct. 7 attack, victory is a long-term process, with ups and downs, but achieved through the relentless march of thousands of martyrs in the “convoy of martyrs” toward the goal.
A good agreement can delay and complicate these efforts, and there are also some encouraging signs in the erosion of Hamas’s status among the broader public in Gaza, which will make it harder for the group to regain its grip on hearts and minds. Still, the decisive factor will be Israel’s determination to aggressively prevent such a resurgence. In this sense, Israel’s offensive policy toward Hezbollah is encouraging and shows that it has learned painful lessons.
With the return of the living hostages—and hopefully, we will see the rest who died in captivity—comes some cautious relief. Yet there are many lessons to be learned—not only in security and diplomacy, but also on communal and societal levels. These include deep divisions and extraordinary civil solidarity between despair and optimism, between darkness and a drive for a better reality. We must remember that optimism and patience prevailed—and apply that spirit to the great challenges still ahead.
