JNS
Former intelligence officer tells JNS that dismissing commanders from reserve duty after their service age has no substance
Days after Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir issued his personal conclusions on the military failures surrounding the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks—and announced a string of dismissals from reserve duty—the internal reckoning has triggered sharp controversy across Israel’s defense establishment.
Cmdr. Eyal Pinko, a researcher at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and a former Israel Navy and intelligence officer, told JNS that while Zamir’s general conclusions were sound, many of the punitive measures amounted to “acts designed for media consumption,” lacking real consequence.
“The sanctions have nothing in them in actuality,” Pinko said. “Refraining from inviting reserve officers who anyway have surpassed their service age is not substantial. The Military Intelligence head was allowed to complete his term. The same is true of the Air Force chief. This is looking like a media act only—a very important statement, but without real punishment.”
Pinko warned that the approach risks eroding confidence among younger commanders, arguing that the steps were taken without first presenting them to Defense Minister Israel Katz, the civilian authority tasked with oversight. “Certainly when it comes to the subject of senior roles,” he said, such coordination is essential.
He also noted that the IDF high command moved ahead before receiving findings from the Defense Ministry’s external comptroller, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yair Volanski, who is reviewing the military’s investigative process.
Pinko stressed that while senior officers should not be sacrificed reflexively—“or else they will fear making mistakes”—the scale of the October massacre demanded a more forceful response. “The October massacre is way beyond light mistakes. There should have been much more significant publishment, such as showing the chief of intelligence the door.”
The crisis raises broader institutional questions, Pinko added. “Where was the Military Advocate General in all of this?” he asked, referring to Maj. Gen. Yifat Tomer-Yerushalmi, who resigned on Oct. 31 and is under arrest in connection with an alleged video leak and false statements to the High Court.
Zamir’s moves followed the submission of findings by the Turgeman Committee, a 12-member panel of major generals and brigadier generals led by former Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman. The committee evaluated the quality of the IDF’s internal investigations into the Oct. 7 failures.
In a video briefing on Nov. 23 and a detailed written document, Zamir outlined reprimands and dismissals from reserve service for several officers, including former Military Intelligence chief Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Haliva; former Operations Directorate head Maj. Gen. Oded Basyuk; and former Southern Command chief Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkelman.
Israeli Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar and Navy Commander V. Adm. David Saar Salma received command reprimands. Maj. Gen. Shlomi Binder, head of the Operations Division during the attacks and now chief of Military Intelligence, was reprimanded and will retire after completing his current term.
But the announcements sparked an immediate clash with Defense Minister Katz, who said Zamir had bypassed his authority. Katz argued that the Turgeman review did not fully probe several critical issues, including the Hamas “Walls of Jericho” plan—a blueprint for the assault that Israeli intelligence first detected in 2018 and fully understood by 2022.
Katz ordered Volanski to review the Turgeman findings within 30 days. Zamir publicly pushed back, saying such a sweeping analysis could not be meaningful in that timeframe. “If any further examination is required to complete the picture,” he said, “it must take the form of an external, objective and independent commission, outside the IDF.”
In summarizing the Turgeman Committee’s findings, Zamir described Oct. 7 as a “national disaster” and an unprecedented systemic failure in the IDF’s duty to defend Israel and its citizens. He cited a series of breakdowns—underestimating Hamas, flawed operational concepts, readiness gaps, intelligence failures and vulnerabilities along the Gaza border.
He stressed that while Israeli forces have since waged a “prolonged, multi-front war” with “remarkable resilience and unprecedented operational successes,” those achievements “do not diminish the magnitude of the failure that occurred in the first 24 hours.”
Pinko, for his part, said the accountability process must reach higher. “Where are Halevi and Kochavi in all of this?” he asked, referencing former IDF chiefs of staff.
As the military attempts to balance responsibility with operational continuity, the public debate—and the rift between the chief of staff and the defense minister—is widening, adding new layers to Israel’s struggle to fully confront the failures of Oct. 7.
